







Lancaster University Management School 







The Curse Of Frankenstein: Visions of Technology and 










The Department of Organisation, Work and Technolog 
Lancaster University Management School 




©Brian  Bloomfield and Theo Vurdubakis  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.co.uk/publications 











THE CURSE OF FRANKENSTEIN:  
Visions of Technology and Society in the Debate  
over New Reproductive Technologies 
 
 







An earlier version of this paper was presented to the British Sociological 
Association Annual Conference on Social Futures: Desire, Excess & Waste, 11-13 














*Centre for the Study of Technology and Organisation **Manchester School of Management 
  Lancaster University Management School     UMIST, P.O. Box 88 
  Lancaster LA1 4PL, UK       Manchester M60 1QD, UK 








THE CURSE OF FRANKENSTEIN:  
Visions of Technology and Society in the Debate  




At each successive moment in their development new reproductive 
technologies have provided the occasion for virulent argument about the 
role of technology in human affairs. And more generally, technoscientific 
knowledge has long been held both in awe and suspicion, with the latter 
acting as a kind of counterbalance to the continuing cultural investment in 
the image of scientific knowledge as empowerment, as the motive force of 
beneficial change. Given this cultural ambivalence the paper focuses on 
media representations of cloning and the ‘designer baby’ (with the latter 
enveloping a debate that has run for almost a decade now) and explores 
the ways utopian images of a world rendered ever more amenable to 
human desires have been closely shadowed by just as compelling 
dystopian visions which are nevertheless constructed from the same 
cultural material. Figures of occidental folklore such as Frankenstein (or 
Jeckyll or Brave New World), thus function as something of a convenient 
shorthand for articulating unease with the direction and pace of 
technological development, or even voicing loss of confidence in the 
modernist technoscientific project of instrumental control. In these 
circumstances, the chimeric notions of the 'designer baby' or the human 
'clone' appear Janus-faced, concurrently representing the powers of human 
creativity as well as the monstrous progeny of an excessive 
epistemophilia. They are in this sense potent metaphors for the 
biotechnological revolution's declared power to re-shape both nature and 





A spectre has long haunted modernity, the spectre that everything solid might indeed 
'melt into air'. This premonition, simultaneously the source of excitement and 
apprehension, has increasingly framed occidental encounters with new reproductive 
technologies. At each successive moment in their development reproductive 
technologies have provided the occasion for (self)reflection upon, and virulent 
argument about, the role of technology in human affairs. Over the last few decades, 
artificial insemination, sperm banks, test-tube babies, the fate of 'surplus' embryos 
(‘snowflakes’), infertility treatment for post-menopausal women, Black women 
having White children for 'social reasons', the 'harvesting' of eggs from cadavers and 
aborted foetuses, Dolly (the sheep clone), Polly (the transgenic sheep clone), the 
ectogenetic goat, the headless tadpole clone, ANDi the genetically modified monkey - 
not to mention frequent dramatic media reports heralding the imminent arrival of the 
'designer baby' or the cloned human - have all featured as foci of interpretive struggle 
and moral controversy. Together these developments (and this is a far from 
exhaustive list) signpost the ways in which the body has come to be viewed as the site 
of an ongoing bio-technological revolution, a veritable new genesis.1 
Against this backdrop, agents of public knowledge such as writers, journalists, 
academics, pressure groups and the like, by commenting on the nature, capacities, 
uses, and future implications of reproductive technology, cater to the need to create 
clarity and meaning out of a reality often too arcane and complex to be represented 'as 
is'. The esoteric (Fleck, 1979) character of most scientific discourse means that the 
only way it ever reaches a lay audience or readership is through social processes of re-
presentation. According to Nelkin (1987:2), "For most people the reality of 
[techno]science is what they read in the press. They understand science less through 
direct experience or past education than through the filter of journalistic language and 
imagery." Such "popularisation" - if that is the right word - is however not, as often 
claimed, a mere rendering of technoscientific work into more digestible language. 
Rather it constitutes a literary enterprise in its own right, that uses particular 
technoscientific developments as its source of inspiration (Caro, 1997) and in turn 
actively shapes cultural expectations of technoscientific work (Fleck, 1979; Squier, 
1995). The discussion which follows focuses on the cultural imagery used in the 
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media to communicate the nature of 'what is happening' and 'why it matters'. It is 
based on the examination of some 700 articles covering new reproductive 
technologies which have appeared in the UK over the past 10 years in English 
language print news media - principally in broadsheets and in (so called quality) 
tabloids. It is important to stress that we do not aim at any comprehensive 
presentation of the content of what was said in quantitative terms, rather we seek to 
explore how it was said and the discursive resources that were employed in doing so. 
Taking the media controversies sparked by Dolly the sheep clone (1997), Adam the 
‘designer baby’ (2000), and Eve the ‘cloned baby’ (2002) as its particular foci of 
interest, the paper examines the various cultural representations of technology, 
identity and social organisation such coverage supports.2 In contrast to other studies 
of media coverage of new reproductive technologies that seek to understand how the 
media shape public understanding through the framing of issues (e.g. Conrad, 1997; 
Nerlich, Clarke & Dingwall, 1999; Petersen, 2001, 2002), as well as the study of 
science communication more generally – e.g. in terms of “journalistic practices, 
routines and intentions” (Hansen, 1994: 112), our focus is on the transgression of 
social/moral boundaries and thereby the deep well of feeling and revulsion – the yuk 
factor - that media representations tap into and exploit. Images of 'technology', it is 
argued, function simultaneously as mirrors of 'society', as a means for articulating and 
rhetorically rehearsing the various philosophical antinomies and moral conflicts 
characteristic of occidental (post?)modernity: nature/culture, subject/object, 
society/individual, free will/determinism, and so on. Accordingly, the paper examines 
the representational resources utilised in the broad discursive struggles over the 
determination of the meaning of the new reproductive technologies. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. First we consider the media responses to 
Dolly and Eve and how the former was seen as the harbinger of the latter. The 
theoretical lens used to illuminate the character of the associated imagery allows us to 
draw out the ways in which the media reporting played on the transgression of social 
boundaries. The second section then turns to consider Adam and the media 
ambivalence surrounding his birth. Of particular note here is the contrast between 
(utopian) therapeutic uses of the new technology and (dystopian) visions of a natural 
order transgressed and subordinated in the pursuit of knowledge and the remaking/re-
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designing of the body - at will. Having focused on the media representations of new 
reproductive technologies we then proceed to consider something of the historical 
origins of the cultural imagery setting forth the expectations about the technological 
reproduction and re-making of the body of which the ‘designer baby’ can be seen as 
the culmination. In this connection Haldane’s Daedalus, or Science and the Future 
(1924) is drawn upon as a landmark statement of the future possibilities of biology. 
The final section discusses the mechanical reproduction (pace Brave New World) and 
re-fashioning of the human body in light of the curse of Frankenstein and its 
prevalence as a discursive resource for commentary on the technoscientific 
endeavour. 
 
Chronicle of a Birth Foretold 
 
"One doesn't expect Dr Frankenstein to show up in wool sweater, baggy 
parka, soft British accent and the face of a bank clerk. But there in all 
banal benignity he was: Dr Ian Wilmut, the first man to create fully 
formed life from adult body parts since Mary Shelley's mad scientist" 
(Time, 10 March 1997: 42-3) 
 
A shared reference point for debates over reproductive technology is the successful 
'cloning' of an adult sheep by scientists at the Roslin Institute in Scotland. The birth of 
'Dolly' the sheep clone in February 1997, whipped up a frenzy of speculation on the 
prospect of human cloning. President Clinton immediately demanded that the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission report to him within 90 days on the 
"troubling implications" of mammalian cloning. That same week the matter was 
raised in the House of Commons at Prime Minister's Question Time with the 
parliamentary committee on science and technology commencing an urgent inquiry 
into the Roslin experiments. The Vatican urged a worldwide ban on cloning, while 
physicist Joseph Rotblat, Nobel laureate and anti-nuclear weapons campaigner 
declared that genetic research posed a danger far greater than the Bomb "because of 
these dreadful developments that are taking place there".3 A Harvard professor wrote 
to Nature demanding that publication of the Roslin results be suppressed as such 
dangerous knowledge should not be publicly available. In California the death penalty 
was proposed as the only punishment fit for the cloners of humans. The sheep clone 
is, Time magazine announced, "an epochal - a cataclysmic - creature" (op.cit.). The 
scale and vigour of such reactions revealed that something more was seen to be at 
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issue here than an (however complex) experiment in biology. Rather, it seemed, it 
was Pandora's box itself that had been opened. Within less than a year, Dolly had 
been followed by Polly, the transgenic sheep clone; the ectogenetic goat; and the 
headless tadpole clone. Could the dreaded human clone be lurking too far behind? 
While the technoscientific establishment (including the Roslin researchers)4 invoked 
human reproductive cloning for the sole purpose of denying it (as technologically 
unfeasible or ethically reprehensible), such denials only served to keep its image in 
the press. Meanwhile, beyond the boundaries of respectable technoscience, an 
informal race was developing among controversial mavericks such Richard Seed, 
Panos Zavos and Severino Antinori, concerning who would be the first to successfully 
clone a human.  
 
On the 27th of December 2002, Dr Brigitte Boisselier director of Clonaid the 
'research arm' of a bizarre New Age cult the Raelians, proclaimed to the world's 
media the creation of the first human clone: a 7lb baby girl named "Eve" supposedly 
born by caesarean birth to a 31 year old ‘American mother’ at 11.55am on December 
26th. Within days of this announcement, Clonaid maintained it had produced a second 
human clone this time born to a Dutch lesbian couple. Three more, the sect claimed, 
were to be born within the next few weeks (e.g. The Independent, 6 January 2003: 2).5 
The group's assertions were greeted with near universal derision. The 
announcement(s) were widely described as a stunt in Clonaid's "sick race for publicity 
with controversial Italian fertility doctor Severino Antinori and US expert Dr Panos 
Zavos" (Daily Mail, 28 December, 2002: 1) both of whom had claimed to be on 
course to produce clones in early 2003. Ian Wilmut and the Royal Society poured 
further scorn upon the Raelians’ pronouncements and declared deep concern about the 
welfare of anyone involved in cloning experiments. While Clonaid had promised that 
all the babies in question would undergo genetic testing to prove their status as clones, 
the promised tests never materialized. Clonaid argued that a threatened lawsuit by 
Miami children rights advocate Bernard Siegel who was seeking to place Eve under 
court protection and remove her from her family "had given them cold feet" (The 
Times, January 4, 2003: 4). However incredulous the Raelians' claims might have 
been, there was scant reassurance to be had for those concerned about the implications 
of human cloning. As the Daily Mail commented: 
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".... there [is not] much comfort to be taken from the possibility that 
the Raelian claim is unfounded. For most analysts predict it is only a 
matter of time before some, perhaps similar, group produces a human 
clone with all the profound emotional and social consequences such a 
breakthrough threatens... the result could be the stuff of nightmares for 
us all" (28 December 2002: 4) 
What kind of stuff are nightmares made of? Here is, for instance, the predicament of 
the human clone (Eve?) as imagined in a Daily Telegraph editorial:  
 
"Imagine finding out, when you are just old enough to understand it, 
that you have been artificially created as the precise copy of someone 
else. Perhaps you are the replica of the woman you thought was your 
mother, which would mean that the closest thing you have to a father 
is really your grandfather. Or perhaps you have been cloned as a copy 
of a famous scientist, doomed always to have your life measured 
against hers. You might even have been manufactured by cultists who 
believe in alien abductions. For once the technology needed for human 
cloning becomes available, it would be hard to restrict its use" (30 
December 2002: 19)6   
 
From this account, the human clone emerges as an anomalous, excessive object, 
something that jumbles up social categorisations. Drawing upon Durkheim’s (1948) 
arguments on the distinctiveness of the sacred and the profane Mary Douglas (1966) 
argues that boundary work is an essential element in sense making. The ordering and 
naming practices that allow some objects to be grouped together but not others, can 
thus be seen as the means through which human collectivities render the world 
intelligible. Following this line of reasoning, new reproductive technologies can be 
understood as problematic objects insofar as they represent the possibility of 
displacement and disruption of the classifications constitutive of the extant social and 
moral order.7 As Douglas notes, classificatory schemata generate cultural anomalies 
and ambiguities: objects, which do not fit, or alternatively, which may fit more than 
one (ostensibly distinct) category. Concepts such as 'designer babies' or 'genetic 
engineering', for instance, belong simultaneously to distinct and even incompatible 
realms of experience and systems of meaning. The new technologies thus stand in for 
the possibility of bringing together into a single identity previously contradictory 
signifiers, as once natural boundaries - between nature and artifice, birth and 
manufacture, the womb and designer commodities - are displaced by technological 
change (see also: Strathern, 1992b; Edwards et al, 1993). What may once have been 
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construed as an oxymoron – e.g. a designed human being - now appears as a realistic 
prospect.  
 
According to Douglas, the human body is typically conceived as a conceptual model, 
or symbolic stand-in, for the social collectivity of which it is part. As we have already 
seen, in addition to the clone, the controversy that is the focus of this discussion, 
revolved around a number of anomalies including inter alia: Post-Menopausal 
Mothers, Black Women implanted with White Donor Eggs, reproduction through the 
use of ova from cadavers and aborted foetuses, transgenic sheep clones, pigs with 
human hearts, mice with human kidneys, and ectogenetic goats. All of these examples 
could be read as physical metaphors for boundary displacement. Boundaries 
constituted by age (the post-menopausal mother); race (the Black mother with the 
White child); life and death (the use of eggs from aborted foetuses and cadavers); 
parentage (the clone); species, (the mouse with a human kidney); the body (the 
ectogenetic goat and the headless clone); genetically desirable and genetically 
undesirable (embryo selection); and so on. All can be represented as ruptures in the 
fabric of the social and moral order. To the extent they can be seen to bring existing 
conceptual/social categories into confusion, they subvert an otherwise orderly reality. 
Correspondingly, their uncertain status is conveyed within media discourses by the 
adoption of a vocabulary of displacement, transgression and violation (Bloomfield 
and Vurdubakis, 1995). Each such category slippage is articulated in terms of feelings 
of anxiety, disorientation, fascination and awe. Thus: "The intention to reverse the 
changes brought by the menopause" noted a Daily Telegraph editorial (1995), 
"strike[s] most people intuitively as an unacceptable interference with the limits that 
nature has set"; while anti-abortion campaigner David Alton MP was reported in The 
Sunday Times to have spoken of a: "macabre and gruesome development which 
denies the great gift of life itself to the unborn but uses it to create new life 
unnaturally in a laboratory" (cited in Lightfoot, 1994). 
 
Regarding the natural relationship between generations (that is, mother, daughter, 
granddaughter and so on), Oddie (1994) argued in The Sunday Times that: 
 
"Even Mary Shelley would have found it difficult to imagine the 
possibilities that could now open out.... An older woman could become 
mother to her own granddaughter, the macabre possibilities are endless" 
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Categorial structures carry a moral urgency, moral breakdown is therefore often seen 
to follow closely on from boundary transgression. Given such premonitions, the 
developments underway can be seen as but steps along a slippery slope to moral 
bankruptcy (Mulkay, 1987) - as indicated in the following statement in The 
Independent by John Habgood (1994) Archbishop of York:  
 
"From the choice about whether to have a baby by means of a donor, it is 
a small step to choices about what kind of baby, and from there, as 
experience in the United States has indicated, to litigation if the "product" 
is not up to specification." 
 
Thus the sacred is invaded by the profane, human life commodified and rendered into 
a consumer product. The concept of unstoppable contamination once the boundaries 
are breached, is the crucial component in slippery slope arguments where the spectre 
is raised that such transgressions may become the norm, assimilated into routine 
procedures of reproduction, and thus rendered mundane. Since the new technologies 
are said to be in the business of bringing into existence what was up to then deemed 
impossible, boundaries can no longer be policed by nature itself. As Lee M. Silver of 
Princeton University put it, Dolly’s creation “basically means there are no limits. It 
means all of science fiction is true” (cited in Ross, 1997; see also Silver 1998; Wilmut 
et al, 2000).   
 
"How long will it be before …. parents sit down in front of a computer 
screen and design their child?" Daily Mirror (10 January 1994) 
 
"The nature of a person will become far less a matter of chance and 
more one of choice. We may not be able to choose our parents, but we 
will be able to change our children by amending or indeed designing 
their genetic make-up. States will have the potential to engineer the 
nature of their citizens." The Independent (8 January 1994) 
 
Visions such as this further reinforce a view of technology as an autonomous force, a 
kind of genie that once released, cannot be returned to the lamp. Society thus appears 
condemned either to repeat a horrific past (Nazism) or to enact some vision of a 
dystopian future (Brave New World) - thus one article in The Sunday Times was 
entitled "The Master Race: Designer Babies" (Hodgkinson, 1994). The notion of the 
'designer baby' can therefore be seen as representing the paradoxical combination of 
two contradictory threats: the spectre of individual difference overwhelmed by 
standardisation (Nazism/Brave New World) coupled with the spectre of social 
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institutions giving way under the pressure of unconstrained individual choice 
(captured in the notion of babies as designer goods) (Hirsch, 1993; Bloomfield & 
Vurdubakis, 1995). 
 
Against this background the status of the clone deserves a closer examination. The 
notion of the 'exact copy' foregrounds concerns about the effects of technology on the 
human Self. Cloning in this sense, constitutes a challenge to embodiment, the Self's 
ontological basis. As such, it is seen as an assault upon human self-recognition, 
threatening personhood and identity with dissolution: If individuals can be 'copied' 
then their individuality is compromised.8 Hence the suggestion by the American 
Institute of Bioethics (1997) that the cloners of humans should be prosecuted under 
US anti-slavery legislation. However, if reproductive technology stands accused of 
undermining identity, it is also accused of its opposite: of rendering identity 
excessive. The rich and powerful, the Hitlers and Saddam Husseins of this world, it is 
claimed, will take the opportunity provided by the new technology in order to 
duplicate themselves (Ira Levin's Boys from Brazil often enlisted as the literary 
reference for this argument9). In either case the boundary between Self and Other is 
subject to slippage and breakdown. 
 
The notion of boundary transgression, and thus pollution, illuminates the abhorrence 
usually associated with anomalies - the so-called yuk factor - but further, it also 
indicates the role of pollution fears in shoring up particular moral positions and social 
arrangements (Douglas 1966). Pollution ideas are deployed in order to safeguard 
boundaries protecting cherished categories. In the case of the new reproductive 
technologies, what is seen as threatening is not the fact that these interfere with 
natural processes (all medical interventions do), but that they do so in a manner that is 
qualitatively different from before: 
 
"If normal medicine is the maintenance and restoration of what nature 
has given, human genetic engineering has to do with steering nature 
out of its normal channels, taking upon ourselves the creation of life 
itself: literally, playing God.... reference to Frankenstein and his 
monster is by no means inappropriate." (Oddie, 1994).  
 
'Normal' medical practice thus appears as the restoration of a natural order subverted 
by disease and abnormality, in contradistinction to genetic engineering which 
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constitutes a technological perversion of that order. The possibility which exercises 
the author of this extract is that genetic engineering may be smuggled in as normal 
medicine10. However, the same vocabulary of purity and pollution can be manoeuvred 
in order to show the same set of developments in a reassuring light. In other words, 
positive perceptions of the new developments, while perhaps less prominent in 
comparison with the (mostly) negative responses we have examined so far, also tend 
to rely upon similar imageries of displacement and of purity versus pollution. Briefly, 
arguments in favour of the new techniques involve a shift of focus in what is 
considered the polluting object. Attention is now being focused on the possibility of 
genetic abnormality, hereditary disease and so on. Where nature is seen to be cruel or 
flawed - as in the case of the child born with a genetic disease or a woman unable to 
conceive in vivo - then science and technology may be called upon to repair the 
natural order. This notion of assisting nature, or making up for its deficiencies, can be 
taken further. For instance, as expressed by Severino Antinori - would-be-cloner and 
a figure also at the center of earlier furores concerning technologically assisted 
pregnancy in post-menopausal women, the growth of human sperm in rats, and 
helping a Catholic priest have a baby without compromising his celibacy11: 
 
"In Britain you have abortions. I create life rather than destroy it... It's 
every woman's right to have a baby - and if nature is refusing to help, I 
take over" (cited in the Daily Mirror,19 August 1994)12  
 
Or as Dr Weatherall of the Institute of Molecular Medicine in Oxford has argued:  
 
"as Peter Medawar has reminded us, if modern evolutionary theory has 
told us anything, it has made it abundantly clear that nature does not 
always know best." Weatherall (1995: 121-2)  
 
Thus, positive responses to new developments in reproductive technology tend be 
couched in a therapeutic vocabulary. They often draw upon pictures of healthy babies  
- "a little miracle of science" (Daily Mail, 19 January 1996: 1) - within happy 
families13: a vision of technology and society working in harmony towards a better 
future (Mulkay, 1997). What opponents argue are grotesque violations of the natural 
order, are revealed as little more than morally sound extensions of established medical 
practice. They are still 'new' but no longer qualitatively different. Thus re-situated, a 
contested technology can now be seen as constituting the means of salvation for the 
suffering and the desperate (Franklin,1990). The rhetorical tension between hope and 
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fear, positive and negative, utopian and dystopian narrative tropes, that attends and 
indeed fashions the debates surrounding new reproductive technologies was very 
much in evidence in coverage surrounding the birth of the world’s ‘first designer 
baby’ as we explore below.  
 
The Two Versions of Adam 
 
“The Birthday Boy Who Was Made-To-Order: Party for the ‘spare-parts 
baby’ and the sister he saved” The Mail on Sunday (26 August 2001) 
 
Adam Nash, born on 29th August 2000 in the USA, proclaimed in the media as “the 
world’s first designer baby” (Guardian Unlimited, 4 October 2000; The Mail on 
Sunday 26 August 2001); a “’custom-made’ boy” (The Guardian, 20 October 2000), 
became a focus of celebration and joy contrasted with concern and fear. For his 
family his birth enabled the possibility of saving the life of his sister Molly who was 
born with a severe genetic condition (Fanconi’s anaemia). What the family needed 
was a donor whose tissue type was as close to Molly as possible and so the possibility 
arose of conceiving a sibling that could be such a donor. However, any such sibling 
might also carry the genetic fault. Accordingly, following IVF procedures some 
twelve embryos were produced from Molly’s parents. From amongst these, one 
embryo was selected for implantation because pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) indicated that it did not carry the fatal disease afflicting Molly.14 Molly’s 
mother underwent a successful pregnancy and shortly after Adam’s birth a subsequent 
transfer of cells to his sister was reported as being successful in enabling her to 
produce the particular sorts of blood cells that her condition had prevented.  
 
Thus one might say that Adam was conceived, selected, and born with a specific 
purpose, as part of a plan:  
 
“’Designer baby’ cures sister” The Guardian (20 October 2000)  
 
Following Molly’s recovery Mrs Nash is reported to have stated: 
 
“The other night, she and I were playing in her room and a song came on 
and she got on the floor and started dancing… And that was when we 
knew that this was the right thing to do.” The Guardian (20 October 2000) 
 
But however compelling the imagery of being born predestined to deliver the gift of 
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life to a suffering sibling, an almost inevitable sense of unease haunts the 
commentary, the spectre of other far less noble uses of the techniques involved. Not 
unexpectedly then, as with the other new technological developments discussed 
above, coverage of the birth of Adam Nash yielded a wide rage of highly ambivalent 
metaphors, images and allusions. 
 
“But whilst the case has inspired sympathy, it has also increased fears 
of babies becoming “commodities” where intelligence and athletic 
prowess are bought. The genetic Pandora’s box is open.” Guardian 
Unlimited (4 October 2000) 
 
The Designer Baby therefore appears in the form of an inferential leap: from the 
reported developments it is inferred that the commodity baby, designed to order by 
scientists, is the logical endpoint of the technological trajectory signposted by existing 
techniques. It signals the culmination of the technoscientific preoccupation with the 
abolition of all human imperfection. While Adam Nash’s genetic make-up was of 
course not the actual object of design it could be argued that the selection of his 
embryo from among others does constitute design, since his particular configuration 
of genes were chosen in preference to those of others. As such his conception, 
selection, implantation and birth can be seen to represent but another step along the 
road to the next stage in baby design. At the same time, following the birth of Adam 
Nash a number of other couples with sick children also found hope in the prospects 
offered by the new technology (The Sunday Times, 2002).15 For instance, in Britain 
Raj and Shahana Hashmi applied successfully to the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) in February 2002 to use embryo selection to produce 
a donor for their sick child Zain. Commenting on the decision a member of LIFE, the 
anti-abortion pressure group, was reported as follows: 
 
 “Should we allow a child to be manufactured in order to serve the 
medical needs of an older brother? Whilst the term ‘designer baby’ is 
often overused, it is all too appropriate in this case.” P. Garrett (cited in 
The Guardian 23 February 2002) 
 
However the permission granted by the authority was challenged in the High Court at 
the end of 2002 by the lobby group Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CRE) on the 
grounds that that the HFEA exceeded its authority. In the event the presiding judge 
ruled that the HFEA had: “no legal power to license embryo selection by tissue typing 
to help sick brothers or sisters” (cited in The Guardian, 21 December 2002). The 
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application by Jayson and Michelle Whitaker whose son Charlie is suffering from 
Diamond-Blackfan anaemia was also refused (this time by the HFEA16).  Ms 
Quintavalle, representative for CRE, commented: 
 
“With social sex selection around the corner and innumerable other 
designer baby possibilities on the horizon, today’s judgment is 
particularly timely. These vital issues involve the very essence of what 
it is to be human.” (Ibid.) 
 
In contrast, from the point of view of the anxious mothers such as Shahana Hashmi, 
denial of access to the contested techniques is re-inscribed in terms of what media 
researchers call the ‘injustice frame’ (e.g. Ganson 1992; 1995), since those 
challenging the HFEA decision, 
 
“could destroy not just Zain’s right to life but that of hundreds of other 
children. What gives them the right to interfere in other people’s lives?” 
(cited in The Guardian, 21 December 2002) 
 
While for Jayson Whitaker, the HFEA refusal to allow the techniques in her son’s 
case was inexplicable: 
 
“how can it be against the law to try to save your son’s life?” (cited in the 
Daily Mail 5 August, 2002: 24). 
 
Taken together then, the two stances outline something of the dilemma that arises 
from the opposition between the notions of individual (or family) need, freedom and 
choice, and society’s right to exert control over what interventions in reproduction can 
and can not be allowed. (And of course by implication rulings on such matters shape 
what ‘kind’ of human beings are born.) Notably, again we can observe that with some 
interested parties the language with which their anxiety is expressed invokes the 
infamous ‘yuk factor’:  
 
“It is deplorable to use the suffering of families as a means of emotional 
blackmail to demand that human embryos in the test tube can be chopped 
up, tested and discarded as if they were inert samples from an industrial 
chemical process.” Paul Tully for SPUC17 (cited in The Daily Telegraph, 
21 December 2002) 
 
While for others new reproductive technologies are not the harbinger of a society in 
which children have been rendered – in the words of President Bush - into “products 
to be designed and manufactured” but simply the most medically efficacious means to 
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a worthy end. Thus Dr Vivienne Nathanson of the British Medical Association 
responded to the court ruling in the following terms: 
 
“As doctors, we believe that, where technology exists that could help a 
dying or seriously ill child without involving major risks for others, then it 
can only be right that it is used.” (cited in The Daily Telegraph, 21 
December 2002) 
 
The case involving the Hashmi family was heard before the Court of Appeal in April 
2003 with the HFEA successfully overturning the High Court ruling: “Judges give go-
ahead for ‘designer baby’ with tissue match to sick boy” (The Guardian, 9 April). 
However, later, when giving reasons for their ruling in May 2003, the appeal court 
judges declared that it “would not result in a ‘free-for-all’ or open the way to IVF for 
‘social selection’” (cited in Guardian Unlimited, May 17). Further, one of the judges, 
Lord Phillips, ruled that “IVF treatment can help women to bear children when they 
are unable to do so by the normal process of fertilisation.” (Ibid.) Again technology is 
seen as a means of assisting nature or making up for its deficiencies. And while 
embryo screening was seen to allow choices about the characteristics of children born 
through this method, thereby raising ethical issues, the choice was ruled to be one that 
lay with the HFEA on the authority of parliament. 
 
The interpretive tensions in the coverage of the ‘designer babies’ in question - and of 
the embryo selection techniques employed in their creation - index their status as 
problematic objects. Once again we see that the boundary between nature and society, 
between legitimate and illegitimate medicine, need and desire is unstable and 
contested. The tension between the contrasting problematisations is conveyed and 
reinforced by the ambivalence that creeps into much of the associated press coverage. 
Thus it is to be noted that while the press makes frequent use of emotive terms that 
play on the ‘yuk factor’ – designer baby, custom-made, spare parts, made to order etc. 
– these are often sanitised within quotation marks. At one and the same time, this use 
of quotation marks denotes distance and connotes proximity. It functions to reinforce 
the undercurrent of prophecy and premonition, which inflects so much of the press 
coverage on new reproductive technologies. Intentionally or otherwise it conveys the 
impression that the developments reported might not (yet) amount to full blown 
instances of baby design, but they nevertheless constitute significant steps along the 
way18. If the designed baby can be thought of as the logical culmination of a path of 
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progression that is indexed by all the developments in new reproductive technology 
referred to earlier (as well as those not discussed here) we would ask what the origin 
of this path might be. Accordingly, the next section considers something of the 
historical imagery that has informed, but also in a way set some of the terms for, 




We have already referred, or alluded to, the profusion of future-oriented images in 
accounts of new reproductive technology. Such imagery tends to draw, either directly 
or by implication upon a shared teleology of technology: Utopia – or for that matter 
dystopia – tends to be thought of less as a place and more as something that is 
established in the future (Nowotny, 1984). It could be argued, that a key moment in 
the history of this imagery occurs in the 1920s when the notion of reproductive 
technology provided a new discursive register for social debates - such as that 
between the socialist British biologist J.B.S. Haldane (1924) and philosopher Bertrand 
Russell (1924) - on the potential of scientific knowledge to generate and uphold new 
forms of social organisation. Haldane's paper, Daedalus, or Science and the Future 
takes as its starting point the potential of "biological interventions" to transform 
society and sets out to outline how this is expected to rewrite the logic of the social 
order. Using (in part) the format of a retrospective essay by a twenty first century 
undergraduate "on the influence of biology on history during the 20th century" (p.39), 
the paper argued that the future of society would be shaped more and more by 
biological knowledge and its applications, just as in the past physics and chemistry 
had been the driving force of change. The argument was illustrated via a (part factual 
part fictional) narrative of developments in reproductive technologies culminating in a 
world in which ectogenesis - conception and development outside the womb - is the 
dominant form of reproduction, with "less than 30 per cent of children .... born of 
woman". A world where parents could effect any improvement they chose upon the 
gene pool, shaping each generation as desired "from increased output of first-class 
music to.... decreased convictions for theft" (op. cit.). In this context human cloning if 
accomplished provides an excellent means for increasing the number of society’s 
most useful members. In such a society, "a great mathematician, poet or painter, could 
most usefully spend life from 55 years on in educating his or her own clonal 
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offspring". Haldane's vision is of a world being perfected through the deliberate 
application of certified knowledge and the corresponding displacement and 
suppression of unwarranted beliefs.  
 
"Our essayist would then perhaps go on to discuss some far more 
radical advances made about 1990, but I have only quoted his account 
of the earlier applications of biology....  If reproduction is once 
completely separated from sexual love mankind will be free in an 
altogether new sense. At present the national character is changing 
slowly according to unknown laws. The problem of politics is to find 
institutions suitable to it. In the future perhaps it may be possible.... to 
change character as quickly as institutions. I can foresee the election 
placards of 300 years hence, if such quaint political methods survive, 
which is perhaps improbable, "Vote Smith and more musicians", 
"Vote for O'Leary and more girls", or perhaps finally "Vote for 
Macpherson and a prehensile tail for your grandchildren". We can 
already alter animal species to an enormous extent, and it seems only a 
question of time before we shall be able to apply the same principles 
to our own" (1924: 42-3).  
 
From the point of view of the argument developed here, of special interest is the 
central overreaching metaphor employed by Haldane, that of "the first modern man" 
(p.36): Daedalus the Athenian inventor and builder of moving statues. As legend has 
it, Daedalus thought up and made the contraption responsible for the Minotaur, the 
monstrous offspring of Queen Pasiphae and a bull. Daedalus' "success in experimental 
genetics" (Haldane, 1995 (1924): 37) incurred King Minos' wrath and caused 
Daedalus' imprisonment, whereupon he designed wings for himself and Icarus, his 
son and apprentice, and flew away from Crete. Daedalus escaped successfully, but 
Icarus, intoxicated with flight, flew too high, the wax with which his wings were held 
together dissolved as he neared the sun, casting him down to drown in the sea that still 
bears his name. Thus Icarus became a symbol of human pride and misplaced self-
confidence - and a warning to stay within the limits set by nature.  
 
Accordingly, Icarus or the Future of Science - Betrand Russell's (1924) response to 
Daedalus and its rewriting of both life and politics - counterpoises the metaphor of 
Icarus who having acquired the power of flight "was destroyed by his rashness".  
 
"I fear", he concluded, “that the same fate may overtake the 
populations whom modern men of science have taught to fly.... 
Technical scientific knowledge does not make men sensible in their 
aims.... science has not given man more self control, more kindliness 
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or more power in discounting their passions" 
 
We may see in the rival positions articulated by Daedalus and Icarus the ambivalence 
associated with cultural representations of technoscience. Let us return briefly to 
Haldane's attraction to the mythological figure of Daedalus. Daedalus "the first to 
demonstrate that the scientific worker is not concerned with gods"19 (p. 37) was 
intended as a replacement for the transgressive figure of Prometheus "the chemical or 
physical inventor" (p.36) as a more appropriate metaphor for modern biology's power 
to reshape society. But perhaps one might see a subtext here: Prometheus was of 
course the model for Mary Shelley's (1993) inventor Victor Frankenstein, himself a 
common metaphor in debates over reproductive technologies (Turney, 1998; Mulkay, 
1997; Rollin, 1995; Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1995).20 Destroyed by his rashness – 
not unlike Icarus - Frankenstein, the New Prometheus, has nevertheless a lot in 
common with Haldane's "scientific worker". What distinguishes Frankenstein's 
experiment from the activities of the alchemists, occultists, and other such real or 
fictional predecessors is his Baconian materialism - symbolised in his project of the 
machine-like construction of a human being from an assortment of parts taken from 
corpses: 
 
"I will pioneer a new way.... and unfold to the world the deepest 
mysteries of creation" (p.37) exclaims Shelley's anti-hero. "banish 
disease from the human race and render man invulnerable to any but 
violent death.... Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds which I 
should first break through and pour a torrent of light into our dark 
world. A new species would bless me as their creator and source; 
many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me." 
(Shelley 1993: 30-44) 
 
Frankenstein's plan for perfecting the world and its inhabitants has proved enduring in 
both fictional and factual treatments of the theme of artificial reproduction, and his 
dream has continued to excite the technoscientific imagination. For instance, in The 
Second Creation (their 'insider' account of the making of Dolly), Wilmut et al (2000) 
set out the implications of their work as follows: 
 
"As decades and centuries pass, the science of cloning and the 
technologies that flow from it will affect all aspects of human life - the 
things that people can do, the way we live, and even, if we so chose, 
the kinds of people we are. Those future technologies will offer our 
successors a degree of control over life's processes that will come 
effectively to seem absolute. Until the birth of Dolly scientists were 
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apt to declare that this or that procedure would be 'biologically 
impossible' - but now that expression seems to have lost all meaning. 
In the 21st century and beyond human ambition is bound only by the 
laws of physics, the rules of logic, and our descendants' own sense of 
right and wrong" (17)  
 
With unintended irony, their vocabulary echoes that of Frankenstein. A glimpse of 
this post-natural age where the limits set by biology have been transcended was also 
conveyed three decades ago by Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (1971). In a section 
entitled "The Pre-Designed Body" (1971: 183), he voiced the expectation that: 
 
"New genetic knowledge will permit us to tinker with human heredity 
and manipulate genes to create altogether new versions of man." 
 
Influenced by Haldane, Toffler's ensuing discussion encompasses a wide range of 
possibilities including cloning, the development of artificial wombs, and eugenics etc. 
 
"within a mere ten to fifteen years a woman will be able to buy a tiny 
frozen embryo, take it to her doctor, have it implanted in her uterus... 
The embryo would, in effect, be sold with a guarantee that the 
resultant baby would be free of genetic defect. The purchaser would 
also be told in advance the colour of the baby's eyes and hair, its sex, 
its probably size at maturity and its probable IQ.... We shall also be 
able to breed babies with super-normal vision or hearing... and 
countless other varieties of the previously monomorphic human being" 
(Toffler, 1971: 185-7) 
 
Clearly, Toffler’s “practopia” is the realization of Archbishop Habgood’s nightmare 
image. Toffler thus goes on to raise the possibility of "breeding men with gills ... for 
efficiency in underwater environments" (p.187) or even a "prehensile tail" (p.188). 
Haldane had of course already made that suggestion in Daedalus (p43). Returning to 
the theme in 1963, he proposed the grafting of animal genes as a means of inducing 
human phenotypes better adapted for particular tasks. For instance, life in space, 
could he recommended, be improved by "prehensile feet, no appreciable heels, and an 
ape like pelvis" (Haldane cited in Dronamraju, 1995). 
 
The idea of resolving the nature/nurture, society/individual antinomy by designing 
humans to meet required specifications has thus proved a remarkably persistent theme 
in discussions of the future possibilities of new reproductive technologies. Questions 
of aptitude and skill are thus recast. Instead of simply training individuals to master 
particular skills, the seductive/unsettling alternative is envisaged of breeding such 
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skills in them. The vision of (genetically) re-engineering, so to speak, the workforce is 
raised as a possibility. Lyon and Gorner (1995: 566) for instance claim that: 
 
"Astronauts on interstellar voyages would benefit if they were able to 
subsist on a plentiful, nonperishable food supply. Thus we might want 
to outfit them with termite digestive genes so that they could live on a 
diet of cellulose... (I)t is almost assuredly going to be possible to 
produce human hybrids with capacities far beyond the norm. Clearly 
such a technology will involve ethical questions that dwarf virtually 
anything we have had to deal with before... Would underwater farmers 
with webbed feet and gills be considered as fully human as the rest of 
us? (emphasis added). 
 
Thus molecular biology opens up the 'human' to re-engineering and modification. It 
becomes subject to assembly and disassembly. Organisms are to be viewed no longer 
as entities but more like jigsaws open to recombination (cf. Cooper, 1995). 
Recombinant DNA processes, it is envisaged, will become the basis of a genetic ars 
combinatoria, dis-assembly and re-assembly not only within but also between 
species. Taking an example of the media representation of this vision, the "prospects 
for the future" were summarised by Newsweek (1994: 43) in the following terms:  
 
"Someday science may be able to manipulate men hormonally to carry 
fetuses, or put human embryos into animal surrogates - could your 
mother, as well as your forefathers - be a chimpanzee?" 
 
It is perhaps easy to dismiss this belief in the total plasticity of human biology, what is 
interesting however is the way such visions rely upon and embody the idea of an 
autonomous 'internal' logic of scientific and technological development. The same 
notion of the technology is prone to both unbridled enthusiasm and radical self-doubt. 
Thus Frankenstein imagines a "race of devils" emerging from his laboratory for which 
"future ages might curse me as their pest" (Shelley, 1993:163). Victor's dark doubts 
are a simple reversal of his earlier, utopic vision. In similar terms Toffler (1971: 184) 
voices his own doubts: 
 
"The ethical, moral and political questions raised by the new biology 
simply boggle the mind. Who shall live and who shall die? What is 
man? Who shall control research into these fields? How shall new 
findings be applied? Might we not unleash horrors for which man is 
totally unprepared? In the opinion of many of the world's leading 
scientists the clock is ticking for a 'biological Hiroshima'."  
 
In The Third Wave (1980), Toffler argues that the same questions he raised earlier still 
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apply; that though some regarded his forecasts as "farfetched" this was "before 1973 
and the discovery of the recombinant DNA process. Today the same anguished 
questions are being asked... as the biological revolution gains runaway speed." 
(Toffler, 1980: 161) In other words, the trajectory set out in Future Shock is indexed 
and reaffirmed by the developments that followed after its publication. Thus the 
certainty afforded by the scientific understanding of the codes which program 
biological existence, and the techniques of genetic engineering which are founded 
upon it, are called upon to authorise the validity of the far reaching projections made 
previously. "It is too early to say with confidence how biotechnology will develop. 
But it is too late to turn back to zero. We cannot undiscover what we know. We can 
only fight to control its application..." (1980: 164). This vision of irreversible change, 
speaks to both technological optimists and pessimists, those exited by, and in awe of 
the dawning "age of biological control" (Wilmut et al, 2000), and those repulsed by it. 
It is not therefore altogether surprising that technoscience – often seen as the very the 
embodiment of reason - is at the same time so prone to mythologisation.   
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The Body in the Age of Technological Reproduction 
 
"The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its 
boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or 
precarious. The body is a complex structure. The functions of its 
different parts and their relation afford a source of symbols for other 
complex structures" (Douglas, 1966: 116).  
 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World – inspired in part by Daedalus - dated itself from 
the year of operation of the Ford assembly plant in Highland Park. In the novel, the 
'genetic engineering' techniques described by Haldane are subjected to assembly line 
efficiency - Frankenstein's project carried out on an industrial scale. The dystopian 
landscape of Brave New World,21 can be seen as a parody of Walter Benjamin's 
(1979) characterisation of modernity as "the age of mechanical reproduction". 
Modern technologies of "reproducibility" (e.g. photography) argued Benjamin, cannot 
but entail a loss of "aura" in the object so reproduced. Benjamin's analysis is echoed 
in Heidegger’s (1977) lament of "enframent" as the process through which the world 
and everything in it, human beings included, is harnessed as a "standing reserve" or 
"stock" (Bestand). Thus the mighty Rhine is "enframed" by the power plant and 
harnessed as a source of hydroelectric power. This entails its loss of "aura" (in 
Benjamin's terms) and its reduction to the status of (usable) standing reserve. 
 
Cloning in this context can be seen as the ultimate technology of "reproducibility". 
Much of the controversy referred to above can therefore be seen as centred on the loss 
of aura it promotes (in human and ungulate alike). What is interesting however is the 
ways in which reproducibility enables the constitution of the subjects of cloning as 
standing reserves, or as a form of capital awaiting commercial exploitation (see: 
Franklin, 2000). In this regard obvious commercial applications involve the 
reproduction of high yielding cows and champion racehorses. Beyond that, cloning 
has found a role in efforts to alter the genetic make up of animals through the 
introduction of human genes in order to produce new variants, which will provide 
human milk, drugs, experimental subjects for medical research, or serve as incubators 
of transplant organs. As regards (the yet unrealised) human cloning, suggestions have 
included: storing an identical replacement of a child as a precaution for parents who 
may fear losing their baby to cot death; producing a clone for spare part transplants or 
transfusions for those suffering from illnesses such as leukaemia; and reproducing 
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much loved relatives (as well as pets22) (Dixon, 1997; Sayers 1997). The headless 
(frog) clone (powerful symbol of non-identity) is in this context held to signify the 
way for human organ factories where parts of human embryos are grown in order to 
'bypass' ethical concerns and legal restrictions23. Bodily frailty, physical decay, even 
mortality itself increasingly appear, as Victor Frankenstein put it, as but "ideal 
bounds" (Shelley, 1997: 30) which technoscience may in the fullness of time 
eradicate. It is the 'designer human' however that perhaps best exemplifies this "age of 
biological control". It suggests, as we have seen, the inversion of the relationship 
between nature and culture (Rabinow, 1996a). The bodies of the future, Haldane, 
Toffler et al intimate, will no longer reflect the genetic lottery but the ebb and flow of 
consumer choice and the inscription of the imperatives of social organisation: the 
ultimate conquest of tyche by techne.  
 
As fantasies of self-creation, the ‘designer baby’ and the human clone thus usher a 
new era of ontological insecurity. When every barrier is (seen as about to be) 
breached and the apple of knowledge eaten to the core, it is not surprising that 
ambivalence about the new technologies is a persistent motif in discussions of 
scientific and technological work. Post-natural amplified bodies, for instance, 
represent the joyful opening of new possibilities, but at the same time generate effects 
of anxiety, disorientation and revulsion. The notorious 'yuk factor' can perhaps be 
seen as a reaction to the loss of 'aura' (variously conceived as personhood, dignity24, 
autonomy etc.) which such projects are seen to facilitate - the new Prometheuses of 
modernity looking at their works and feeling sick. An essential tenet of the 
Frankenstein mythos - from Shelley's tale to Jurassic Park - is that moral and 
intellectual failure often accompanies technoscientific success.25 The suspicion is that 
the promises of empowerment and renewal will be betrayed and that the forces 
unleashed are destined to escape any system set up to control them. The ‘curse of 
Frankenstein’ so to speak, can therefore be summed up as an enduring legacy of 
distrust of those same activities that attempt to render the world better suited to 
human needs, and more amenable to human desires, through the application of 
technoscientific knowledge. The inkling persists that it is not only the sleep of reason 
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1 The non-human examples in this list figure because they were seen both to mark significant 
developments in their own right and more importantly, as far as the argument advanced here is 
concerned, are seen to herald important developments that might soon be realised in respect of humans. 
2 For related discussions of media representations of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) see: Franklin (1997); of 
embryo research see: Mulkay (1997: 69-82). 
3 ‘Nobel scientist warns of cloning peril’, available at: www.netlink.de/gen/Zeitung/970225c.htm. 
4 E.g. Jaenisch and Wilmut  (2001); Gibbs (2001); Daily Express October 11, 2000: p.1. 
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5 At the time of writing, five births in all have been announced by the sect, while a ‘second  generation’ 
of twenty more is said to be on its way (see: www.clonaid.com)  The Raelians believe that bodily 
duplication through cloning is the route to immortality - as humans do not posses divine souls. They 
thus hope that "personalities and memories" can be a uploaded "straight into this new body" (Rael cited 
in Preston, 2003: 2). "The worlds greatest UFO related organisation" claims 60000 adherents in 100 
countries (see clonaid op. cit) and is named after their leader and founder Rael. The former Claude 
Vorilhon (a French motoring journalist) claims to be the brother of Jesus - a fact revealed to him by 
Yahweh in the course of an informal lunch with Christ, Mohammed and the Buddha on planet Elohim 
(Preston, 2003: 1) - and is destined to lead humanity into a blissful techno-utopian future (Alexander, 
2001). 
6 This type of argument was first formulated by Hans Jonas (1974: 159 ff). 
7 As Rabinow contends, it isn’t just the newness of technoscientific developments “that leaves us 
culturally unprepared” but also the “background assumptions and practices that lurk unexamined at the 
edges… that contextualize the technology and frame our questions and responses.” (Rabinow, 1996b: 
130) For Rabinow, these assumptions (in Western culture) include the “lingering residuum of Christian 
beliefs which hold the ‘body’ to be a sacred vessel”. 
8 Counter to the notion that (reproductive) cloning epitomises technological development gone awry, 
one academic writing in The Daily Telegraph opined: “Essentially, human cloning would be like 
producing rather a lot of twins, for clones would have exactly the same genetic identity as twins. No 
one thinks identical twins are uncanny or horrible. So what is the difference? Well, it would be hard to 
describe the relation of father to son or mother to daughter. The ‘son’ would be the twin of his ‘father’ 
and so on. But that is not an argument against cloning, merely an accurate description of what it is.” 
Casey (2001). For Nathan Myhrvold former Microsoft CTO opposition to cloning amounts to “just 
another form of racism” since it discriminates against (potential?) “people based on another genetic 
trait – the fact that somebody already has an identical DNA sequence” (cited in Alexander, 2001).  
9 See Van Dijck 2000. The fear of clone armies has also been voiced by, for instance the members of 
the Wellcome focus group members (1998) and notably, by the late Cardinal O’Connor of New York  
“You could just keep producing and say, ‘They are expendable. Give ‘em a gun and send ‘em out” 
(cited in Alexander, 20001). 
10 Similar arguments have been made concerning the distinction between therapeutic and reproductive 
cloning. 
11 The procedure involved siphoning off the latter’s unejaculated sperm and using it to fertilise the egg 
of a surrogate (Gibbs, 2001). 
12 “It is the right of every American citizen to have a child …Let us show the proper compassion for 
those suffering American infertile couples. Let us give them some hope and let us not turn our backs on 
them. They deserve something better than that”, testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources by Panos Zavos (2002: 2-3), another would-be-
cloner and former Antinori associate. 
13 A number of observers (e.g. Fox 1992; Lambert, 1992; Melhuus, 1992) have been intrigued by a 
perceived paradox; namely that public debate over the new developments in reproductive technology 
had the apparent effect of subverting their radical social potential by re-contextualising them as 
essentially dedicated to the assistance of the nuclear heterosexual family. From the point of view 
adopted here, the operation of the model of the nuclear family as a sort of discursive a priori in the 
repertoire of exponents, appears less paradoxical given the perceived need of proponents to defuse the 
status of these technologies as potential sources of destabilisation and anomaly. In other words, the 
concept of the nuclear family functioned as a sort of 'container', a means of normalising the otherness 
of technology (cf. Schneider, 1992; for a discussion of the topic see: Mulkay, 1994). 
14 It is reported that of the other embryos one tested positive for the disease and was destroyed while 
the remaining ones were frozen (The Guardian, October 20, 2000). 
15 In another case, parents of four boys who had suffered the loss of their only daughter requested the 
use of IVF and embryo selection in order to guarantee the birth of a new daughter. Their application 
was refused by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 
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16 On the basis that the genetic cause of his disorder has not yet been identified so the pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis would be used solely to ensure a tissue match – not to prevent a genetic defect from 
being passed on (cited in the Daily Mail 2 August, 2002: 1). 
17 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. 
18 Donald MacKenzie (1992) for instance, has suggested that technological trajectories rather than 
being the unfolding of an intrinsic disembodied techno-logic, are best viewed as the institutionalisation 
of particular sets of (self-fulfilling) cultural expectations. See also Fleck (1979: 33). 
19 This point deserves some comment. Clearly the Minotaur was only one among the many hybrid 
creatures which populated the mythological landscape. What made him unique however was that 
unlike them he was a human creation and thus not part of the normal ‘furniture of the world’. Not 
dissimilarly, the dinosaurs in Conan Doyle’s Lost World, are discovered in a remote Amazon location. 
In Jurassic Park however, the Crichton – Spielberg re-telling of this tale, the dinosaurs are, so to speak, 
post-natural the intentional products of genetic engineering (Strathern, 1992a; Franklin, 2000). 
Similarly, in the story “chaos theory” has taken on the role previously performed by divine disapproval.    
20 Indeed, Turney cites examples from the media dating back to the early part of the Twentieth Century. 
21 This is not however to deny the thread of ambivalence sustained throughout the novel which stems 
from the attraction of social order that science and technology seemingly make possible. 
22 See for instance  www.missiplicity.com. 
23 See for instance ‘Grow-Your–Own alternatives may solve dilemma’ (Highfield, 1998: 6). 
24 As for instance, in the UN’s declaration of reproductive cloning as contrary to “human dignity”.  
25 Margaret Atwood’s  (2003) Oryx and Crake is the most recent contribution to this mythos. The 
narrative is populated by various laboratory created hybrids such as “woolvogs”, “pigoons” and 
“rakunks” – scientific experiments gone awry and rebounding on their creators.  
